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Case Notes
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE-FEDERAL COMMON LAW
IN AvIATION-Federal Rather Than State Law Should Be Applied
to Determine the Rights and Liabilities of the Parties Involved in a
Mid-air Collision. Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400
(7th Cir. 1974) cert. denied, -U.S.-, 95 S. Ct. 1980 (1975).
On September 9, 1969, near Shelbyville, Indiana, a private
plane operated by a student pilot flying under visual ffight rules
collided with an Allegheny Airlines DC-9 which was receiving and
adhering to air traffic control radar directions from an employee of
the Federal Aviation Administration and was flying under instru-
ment flight rules. Both planes were destroyed and all eighty-three
occupants died. Wrongful death actions to recover damages were
brought in eight United States District Courts and subsequently
were transferred to the United States District Court of Indiana for
consolidated pretrial proceedings under the jurisdiction of the Ju-
dicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.' Defendants Allegheny Air-
lines and the United States filed cross claims and third party com-
plaints against the estate of the student pilot, the corporate owner
of the private plane, and its parent company. Allegheny and the
United States then settled the claims of the passengers against them
and proceeded against the other three defendants for contribution
and indemnity. The district court, however, dismissed the claims
for contribution and indemnity, holding that Indiana law applied
and that under Indiana law, no such rights existed. Allegheny and
the United States appealed, contending that a federal rule of con-
tribution and indemnity should govern the case rather than the In-
diana law. Held, reversed:' The predominant interest of the Feder-
al government in regulating aviation dictates that federal law,
rather than state law of contribution and indemnity,' should be
IIn re Mid-Air Collision near Fairland, Indiana, 309 F. Supp. 621 (Jud. Pan.
Mult. Lit. 1970).
2 Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974).
'Having determined that a federal rule of contribution and indemnity among
joint tortfeasors should control in aviation collisions, the court rejected the con-
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applied in actions arising from mid-air collisions in national air-
space. Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir.
1974) cert. denied, -U.S.-, 95 S. Ct. 1980 (1975).'
The question of which law is to be applied in any aircrash case
is not easily answered.' It is generally assumed that state law will
apply in determining the rights of the parties, the only question be-
ing that of determining which state's law is to apply. A leading
aviation case in the choice of law area that exemplifies some of the
difficulties one encounters in answering that question is Kilberg v.
Northeast Airlines.! In Kilberg, a New York resident died in an
aviation accident occurring in Massachusetts. The estate brought a
wrongful death action in New York state court for damages in ex-
cess of that allowed by Massachusett's wrongful death statute. The
New York court, moving away from the old lex loci doctrine that
the law of the place of the accident should control, announced that
public policy of New York dictated that the Massachusetts limi-
tations would be inapplicable.' As a result of varied state tort law
and the difficult task of determining the outcome of a Kilberg type
analysis, the aviation accident lawyer must wait until the choice of
law issue is decided before he can properly frame his grounds for
recovery or his defense." The application of a uniform federal avia-
tion tort law would, of course, foreclose the necessity for such anal-
ysis and prevent the abuses of forum shopping that are existent
under present law. If the rights of the parties in aviation litigation
were determined by a uniform law, aircrash litigation would be
simpler, less expensive, and more predictable. Unfortunately, there
tention that the rule should be one of "no contribution" and determined that
contribution and indemnity should be applied on a comparative negligence basis.
Id. at 405.
4Justice Douglas voted to grant certiorari.
See Abramson, Where to Sue in Aviation Products Liability Cases, 40 J.
Am L. & COM. 369 (1974) for a discussion of the factors to be considered in
aviation litigation when selecting the forum and opting for the law of one state
over that of another state; See also Note, 41 J. AIR L. & CoM. 133 (1975).
69 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961); See also Babcock
v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963); but see
Neumier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
79 N.Y.2d 40, 172 N.E.2d 528, 211 N.Y.S.2d 136 (1961).
'For a discussion of the various choice of law problems facing the aviation
lawyer, see Abramson, Where to Sue in Aviation Products Liability Cases, 40
J. AIR L. & CoM. 369 (1974) and Leflar, Choice Influencing Considerations in
Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267 (1966).
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simply is no uniform federal tort law in aviation at present, nor,
until Kohr, have adequate grounds ever been found for imposing
one. The Seventh Circuit, in an uninformative opinion, has at-
tempted to dispose of a most difficult problem in a single para-
graph." In that paragraph, the court gave, as the reason for its de-
cision, that federal interest in aviation in general, joined with the
presence of the United States as a party, and supervision by the Ju-
dicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation left no perceptible reason
why a federal law should not be imposed to determine the rights
and liabilities of the parties.'"
The first Congress of the United States, after considering the
question of which law should be applied in civil actions in federal
court, provided for a federal system in section 34 of the Federal
Judiciary Act of 1789," now the Rules of Decision Act.' The
Supreme Court's interpretation of this Act, as voiced by Justice
Brandeis in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins," seemed to indicate the
Act had destroyed any notion that there existed a federal common
law. Later statements by Justice Brandeis," legal scholars" and sub-
sequent courts," however, indicate that a federal common law may
still exist. A federal common law has been considered applicable in
diversity actions, primarily to fill in interstitially or otherwise ef-
fectuate the statutory patterns enacted by Congress," and in areas
9 Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, 504 F.2d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
- U.S. -, 95 S.Ct. 1980 (1975).
10 1d.
11 Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 92.
12 Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1970):
The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or the
treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise pro-
vide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the
Courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.
"3304 U.S. 64 (1938).
1' On the same day Erie was decided, Justice Brandeis, speaking for the court,
wrote that "whether the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned be-
tween the two states is a question of 'federal common law' upon which neither
the statutes nor the decisions of either state can be conclusive." Hinderliter v.
La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938).
12 See, e.g., McCormick and Hewins, The Collapse of "General Law" in the
Federal Courts, 33 ILL. L. REv. 126, 144 (1938).
"ISee Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); Clear-
field Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); and Ivy Broadcasting Co.,
Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 391 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).
"See Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discre-
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where federal interest is strong and the overall regulatory statutes
are comprehensive,"8 i.e., when federal law has preempted"' state
law. Unfortunately, no precise standard for determining when fed-
eral law has preempted state law exists. 0
When Congress expressly states that a field is to be regulated by
the federal government, Congress has already made the determina-
tion, but this is seldom the case, and in all other cases the courts
must make a determination of the implied intent of Congress."
The proposition that federal legislation in the field of aviation
might give rise to a cause of action under federal common law by
way of preemption is not new to aircrash litigators and has been
considered in several contexts prior to Kohr. In Rogers v. Ray
Gardner Flying Service," the plaintiffs argued that a section of the
tion in the Choice of National and State Rules of Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv.
797, 800 (1957).
18 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); Ivy Broadcast-
ing Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 391 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).
19 Preemption of state law is generally defined as manifest congressional in-
tent to control an activity to the exclusion of state law.
"
0 The commerce powers of the federal government have preempted state
laws in several areas, including regulation of railway safety equipment, Napier
v. Atl. Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605 (1926); interstate shipment of food prod-
ucts, Cloverleaf Butter v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942); and in the registration
of aliens, Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). State law has been held
not preempted in areas involving the interstate shipment of fresh fruits, Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963) (California statute spe-
cifying the minimum oil content of fresh avocadoes entering the state held valid);
the control of striking workers, Allen Bradley Local 1111, United Elec. Workers
v. Wisconsin Empl. Bd., 315 U.S. 740 (1942) (state statute regulating pub-
lic demonstrations held not repugnant to National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. S 151 et seq. (1970); and regulation of equipment and operating stan-
dards for ships on navigable waters, Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362
U.S. 440 (1960) (city pollution ordinance held applicable to vessels operating
on navigable waterways subject to federal license requirements).2 The Supreme Court, in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator, 331 U.S. 218 (1947),
articulated a three pronged test to determine the intent of Congress when none
was clearly expressed:
(i) when the scheme of federal preemption is so pervasive as to
make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the
states to supplement it, or
(ii) if the act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal
interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to
preclude the enforcement of state laws on the same subject, or,
(iii) if the state law may produce a result inconsistent with the
federal statute, the federal measure must prevail.
id. at 230.
22435 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
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Federal Aviation Act23 evidenced a preemption of Oklahoma bail-
ment law." The Fifth Circuit did not question that Congress could
preempt state law under its Commerce Clause' powers, with regard
to liabilities for injuries resulting from aircrashes, but the court
was not convinced that Congress had clearly indicated any such
intent.' Later, in McCord v. Dixie Aviation," the Tenth Circuit,
interpreting the same definitional section of the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958,8 refused, by relying on Rogers and on general public
policy grounds,"9 to apply federal common law to aviation torts. In
McCord, the court recognized that sufficient legislative intent would
justify imposition of federal tort law but refused to find the neces-
sary strength of interest or comprehensiveness of control to justify
its imposition." In the opinion of the court, to impose a federal
common law "would constitute abusive judicial law making" better
directed to the "law making power of Congress than the adjudica-
23Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, as amended, S 101(26), 49
U.S.C. § 1301(26) (1970), formerly Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601,
52 Stat. 973, provides:
'Operation of Aircraft' or 'operate aircraft' means the use of air-
craft, for the purpose of air navigation of aircraft, and includes the
navigation of aircraft. Any person who causes or authorizes the op-
erator of aircraft whether with or without the right of legal control
(in the capacity of owner, lessee or otherwise) of the aircraft, shall
be deemed to be engaged in the operation of aircraft within the
meaning of this chapter.
The House Committee Report on § 101(26), which amended the Civil Aero-
nautics Act of 1938, stated:
Provisions of present Federal and State law might be construed to
impose upon persons who are owners of aircraft for security pur-
poses only, or who are lessors of aircraft, liability for damages
caused by the operation of such aircraft even though they have
no control over the operation of the aircraft. This bill would re-
move this doubt by providing clearly that such persons have no
liability under such circumstances. (Emphasis added).
H.R. Rep. No. 2091, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1836 (1948).
24 The Oklahoma Supreme Court has expressly held that the negligence of
the bailee of an airplane may not be imputed to the bailor. Spartan Aircraft Co.
v. Jamison, 181 Okla. 645, 75 P.2d 1096 (1938).
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
26435 F.2d at 1393.
27450 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1971).
28 For another case interpreting this section, see Rosdail v. W. Aviation, Inc.,
297 F. Supp. 681 (D. Colo. 1969); see also Note, 48 TEx. L. REv. 488 (1970),
and Comment, Liability of the Owner of an Aircraft Under the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958, 38 J. AIR L. & COM. 547 (1972).
29450 F.2d at 1130-31.
0 1d. at 1131.
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tive power of the court." 1 Finally, in City of Burbank v. Lockheed
Air Terminal, Inc.," the Supreme Court, faced with the conflict
between a local noise control ordinance' and what Lockheed al-
leged to be overriding federal regulations, announced that there
was federal preemption of the field of aviation noise control because
the federal statutory scheme was so pervasive as to foreclose the
possibility of compatible state regulation.' Despite comprehensive
statutes" and legislative history in support of the majority decision,
four justices dissented," stating that Congress could preempt the
field if it chose, and that the authority" conferred on the Adminis-
trator of the F.A.A. by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 is suf-
ficient to authorize him to promulgate regulations effectively pre-
empting local action, but neither Congress nor the Administrator
had chosen to take such action."
Unlike the Rogers, McCord, and City of Burbank cases, in which
the plaintiffs relied on specific statutory provisions, there is no
section of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, nor of any other fed-
eral act dealing with aviation, which relates specifically to contri-
bution and indemnity, nor to substantive tort law in general, from
which a federal common law via preemption could be inferred. If
the Kohr decision can be justified at all, the justification must come
from the more general provisions of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958, or from some other federal act. The only provision of the
Federal Aviation Act, cited by the Seventh Circuit in Kohr,' sec-
tion 1108, ' declares the United States is to possess and exercise
complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the airspace of the
31 Id.
82411 U.S. 624 (1973).
33 Burbank Municipal Code S 20-32.1 made it unlawful for pure jet aircraft
to take off from the Hollywood-Burbank Airport between 11 P.M. of one day
and 7 A.M. the next day. See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.,
411 U.S. 624, 625, 626 (1973).
11411 U.S. at 638.
The court found ample support for their decision in implied preemption of
state law by the Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. 5 4901 (1974); and sec-
tion 611 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. S 1301 (1958), both
statutes being directly involved with federal regulation of aircraft noise control.
" Justices Rehnquist, Stewart, White, and Marshall dissented, 411 U.S. at 640.
3749 U.S.C. § 1431 (1958).
88411 U.S. at 653.
39 504 F.2d at 404.
4049 U.S.C. § 1508(a) (1958).
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United States. This section, however, is entitled "Foreign Aircraft"
and primarily concerns the United States sovereignty over aircraft
of other nations flying in American airspace.'
Reliance on this section ignores the express purpose of the Act of
1958: "to create one unified system of flight rules and to crystallize
in the Administrator the power to promulgate rules for the safe
and efficient use of the country's airspace."" The federal aviation
program regulates the licensing, inspection and registration of air-
craft. It makes no provision for its application to tort liability and,
in fact, specifically provides that nothing in the program shall
abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by
statute."3
Unfortunately, the Kohr opinion fails to point out any other
section of the Federal Aviation Act from which federal preemption
of tort law can be inferred. An erroneous assumption in the Kohr
opinion that the section of the Act discussed above" is sufficient to
evidence federal preemption over aviation tort law is followed by
the unsupported statements that the fact that the government was
a party to the suit and the litigation had, since its inception, been
subject to supervision by the Judicial Panel created by the Multi-
district Litigation Act,' justified the imposition of federal law."
41 This section is a reenactment, without substantial change, of section 6(a) of
the Air Commerce Act of 1926, which, in its original form, provided: "Mhe
Government of the United States has, to the Exclusion of all foreign nations,
complete sovereignty of the airspace . . . of the United States. (emphasis sup-
plied) Air Commerce Act of May 20, 1926, ch. 344, § 6(a), 44 Stat. 568.
4United States v. Christensen, 419 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1969); Airline Pilots
Assoc. v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960).
4349 U.S.C. S 1506 (1970). Further evidence that federal legislation has not
preempted the field of tort litigation is the introduction of a bill to accomplish
that end by Senator Tydings in 1968. S. 3305-6, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
Recognizing the lack of uniformity and inability of the courts to do precisely
what the Seventh Circuit in Kohr has done, Senator Tydings introduced a bill,
which, in its final draft, provided exclusive federal jurisdiction for "those aircraft
crashes which involve substantial numbers of people and suits in multiple courts"
and a "uniform body of Federal law should apply to all aviation activities . . .
within the national sovereignty of the United States." S. 961, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 3248 (1969). Overall support for the bill was lacking
and the bill never left the Judiciary Committee following Senator Tyding's un-
successful bid for reelection. See Landers, The Tydings Bill, 36 J. AIR L. & CoM.
550, 556 (1970).
44 Note 40 supra.
-28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1970).
"504 F.2d at 404.
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The Federal Tort Claims Act,"' under which the United States
was a party to Kohr, calls for application of the law of the state
wherein the injury took place. ' Decisions under the Federal Tort
Claims Act agree that the liability of the United States for injuries
and damages is governed in the same manner and to the same extent
as a private individual's liability under the controlling statutes of
the state where the injury took place."9 John Kennelly"° has sug-
gested that when the United States is to be denied contribution,
public policy would justify "judicial creativeness" in the imposition
of a uniform rule of contribution by the federal judiciary rather
than waiting for congressional action. 1 Kennelly's argument as-
sumes it is somehow inequitable for the government to pay a dis-
proportionate amount in settlement of a claim. For a federal court
to make such an assumption, however, would be to overstep the
bounds of judicial creativeness at the expense of an intrusion on the
rights of individual states to promulgate substantive tort law and in
contravention of the express intent of Congress. 2
The Multidistrict Litigation Act,9 which provides for the Judicial
Panel that supervised the proceedings in Kohr," similarly provides
no basis for imposing federal law. Although the Multidistrict Litiga-
tion Act makes no provision for the law to be applied, cases decided
under the Act have uniformly held that the substantive law of the
transferor forum will apply after transfer for coordinated or con-
solidated pretrial proceedings.' The application of the law of the
transferor state, additionally, is consistent with the rules for choos-
ing the applicable law under changes of venue."
4728 U.S.C. 5 1346 (1970).
48 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1970); See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962);
Van Wie v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 22 (N.D. Iowa 1948).
49 United States v. Praylou, 208 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1953).
" Eminent aviation lawyer and author of LITIGATION AND TRIAL OF AIR CRASH
CASES (1968).
5" 2 JOHN KENNELLY, LITIGATION AND TRIAL OF AIR CRASH CASES, 8: 125
(1968).
2 See note 43 supra.
5328 U.S.C. § 1407 (1970).
54 450 F.2d at 404.
1 In re Four Seasons Securities Law Litigation, 370 F. Supp. 219 (D. Okla.
1974); In re Plumbing Fixtures Litigation, 342 F. Supp. 756 (Jud. Pan. Mult.
Lit. 1972).
""A change of venue under S 1404(a) generally should be, with respect to
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The implications of Kohr are far reaching. First, the reasoning
of the Seventh Circuit, that a federal law of contribution and in-
demnity applies to aviation torts, could be expanded to include
every facet of aviation litigation, including limitations, wrongful
death recovery limits, defenses of contributory negligence, and a
myriad of other negligence doctrines. The Seventh Circuit did not
elaborate on how it arrived at the conclusion that the federal law of
contribution and indemnity would be based on comparative negli-
gence." Seemingly, it would be possible to impose such controversial
doctrines as strict liability and crashworthiness just as easily. Sec-
ondly, the Kohr decision seems to open the doors to the already
criticized&8 idea that the Federal Aviation Act creates duties of care
which, once violated, give rise to a federal cause of action, and thus
to federal question jurisdiction.
In Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp.,9 an action arising out of a colli-
sion between a commercial airliner and a military aircraft, a pas-
senger of the airline sought relief against Hughes in federal court
based upon federal question jurisdiction" and the regulation of
commerce, 1 there being no diversity of citizenship."5 Hughes moved
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, alleging that no federal question
existed, nor was any actionable right conferred under the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958 regulating air commerce which would give
jurisdiction as a case arising under an act of Congress regulating
commerce." The district court denied the motion, reasoning that
federal law is not silent as to the duties imposed upon operations of
aircraft and the corresponding rights of the parties." The district
state law, but a change in courtroom." Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612,
639 (1964).
57 450 F.2d at 405.
38 D'Arcy v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 12 Av. Cas. 18,282 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
5' 350 F. Supp. 612 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
6028 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970): "The district courts shall have original juris-
diction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $10,000, exclusive of interests and costs, and arises under the Constitu-
tion, laws, or treaties of the United States."
61 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970): "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating
commerce or protecting trade and commerce against restraints and monopolies."
6228 U.S.C. S 1332(c) (1970).
a28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970).
350 F. Supp. at 612.
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court reported that the source of the right to recover is found in the
duties imposed, and the rights flowing therefrom, as contained in
the Federal Aviation Act6' passed under the Commerce Clause,"
and that jurisdiction over the litigation lay under sections 1331 and
1337 of 28 U.S.C." While the majority of major air crashes involve
citizens of different states and damages far in excess of $10,000,
thus giving rise to diversity jurisdiction," Gabel, now supported by
Kohr, not only opens the federal courts to purely intrastate disputes
in aviation litigation, but makes available the federal common law
as a basis for recovery, when none would have been available under
state law.
The Seventh Circuit in Kohr was faced with a tempting oppor-
tunity. The alternatives open to the court were to deny contribution
from a joint tortfeasor to Allegheny and the United States, or to
radically change the complexion of aircrash litigation, and achieve
an equitable apportionment of loss among the parties. By choosing
the latter, the court has become midwife to an aspect of aviation
law which many thought had been aborted when the Tydings Bill
failed.6 While violative of states' rights to promulgate substantive
tort law, and unsupported by the Rules of Decision Act"0 and inter-
pretations of the various federal acts upon which the court relies,
the decision has at least focused attention, once again, on the de-
sirability of a uniform tort law for aviation litigation.
Steven D. Nelson
ILLINOIS EXCISE TAXES-RETAILERS' OCCUPATIONAL TAX
AND USE TAx-The Illinois Retailers' Occupational and Use Tax
Are Validly Applied to Airlines and Their Food Supplier Because
the Foodstuffs and Beverages Are Not Purchased For "Resale"
Since No Distinct Consideration Is Paid By the Passengers For Meal
449 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. (1958).
U.S. CONST. art. I, 8.
7 28 U.S.C. 5 1331(a) (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970); 350 F. Supp. at 615.
08 28 U.S.C. 5 1332.
" See note 43 supra.
7028 U.S.C. § 1652 (1948).
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Service-American Airlines v. Department of Revenue, 58 Ill.2d
251, 319 N.E.2d 28 (Ill. 1974).
In 1963, Illinois retail tax revenue rules were amended to allow
taxation of the sale to airlines of food and beverages used to serve
passengers and crews. As a result of this change, food and beverage
suppliers were made liable for the Illinois Retailers' Occupational
Tax and airlines which purchased such supplies were made liable
for the Illinois Use Tax. After paying the tax, both American Air-
lines and its food supplier, Hot Shoppes, filed claims for credit from
the Illinois Department of Revenue. With the rejection of these
claims, suit was filed by the airline and the food supplier for recov-
ery of the tax paid. Because the Circuit Court of Illinois upheld the
Department of Revenue's determination, both taxpayers appealed
to the Illinois Supreme Court. The appeal was granted. Held: af-
firmed. The Illinois Retailers' Occupational and Use Tax are valid-
ly applied to airlines and their food suppliers because the foodstuffs
and beverages are not purchased for "resale" since no distinct con-
sideration is paid by the passengers for meal service. American
Airlines v. Department of Revenue 58 ll.2d 251, 319 N.E.2d 28
(1974).
Because of limitations in the state constitution prohibiting the
imposition of a traditional sales tax,' the Illinois legislature has been
forced to utilize a license or occupational tax.' The legislature has
made retailers responsible for a retailers' occupational tax,' based on
'The Retailers' Occupational Tax presently in effect is the second tax of its
type in Illinois. (Act of June 28, 1933, effective July 1, 1933). The first tax, passed
in March 22, 1933 and effective on March 22, 1933, was held unconstitutional
by the Illinois Supreme Court in Winter v. Barrett, 186 N.E. 113, 352 Ill. 441
(1933). The grounds of the decision were basically twofold. By exemption of
certain sales from the original tax, the effect of the tax was to create an illegal
classification in violation of the uniformity requirements of Art. IX, Sec. 1 of the
Illinois Constitution and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the federal constitution. In addition, by providing for a double appropriation
to emergency unemployment relief and to reduction of property taxes, the new
tax violated Art. V, Sec. 16 of the Illinois Constitution. CCH STATE TAX REP.,
ILL. 5 60-002 (1967).
'ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 120 § 440 (1974). The act passed on June 28,
1933, effective July 1, 1933, was held constitutional in Reif v. Barrett, 355 111.
104, 188 N.E. 889 (1933). The new act eliminated the questionable exemptions
and reduced the rate from three per cent to two per cent. CCH STATE TAX REP.
ILL. 5 60-002 (1967).
3ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 120 S 440 (1974). The Retailers' Occupational
Tax applies to all retail sales. There are, however, several areas or groups of sales
1975]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
gross receipts4 and a purchaser liable for a use tax! calculated on
selling price.' Because the Illinois Retailers' Occupational Tax'
(hereinafter IROT) uses the gross receipts of the retailer as its tax-
able base, it has the same effect as a traditional sales tax.' The use
tax, though collected by retailers from purchasers, does not have to
be remitted by retailers if the IROT is remitted on the same sale.'
Under this scheme, the retailers are permitted to reimburse them-
selves at the expense of the purchaser in the form of the Use Tax. In
the American Airlines case, although Hot Shoppes was held liable
for the IROT, American was also liable for payment of the Use Tax.
Before the amendment of the retail tax revenue rules designed
by the State Department of Revenue to clarify the different types of
vendors who are subject to the IROT, Rule 7 ( 1 ) covered vendors
of tangible personal property which are exempt from the operation of the tax.
These exempted areas include sales protected by the federal constitution, sales
to charitable, religious, and educational organizations, and sales of newsprint and
ink. ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 120 S 441 (1974).
4 Id.
"ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 120 § 439 (1974). Enacted in 1955, this tax is
applied at the same rate as the Retailers' Occupational Tax.
6 ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 120 S 439.2 (1974).
7 ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 120 §§ 440-441 (1974).
' The text of this note has presented a rather simplistic view of sales taxes
to avoid confusion. SCHULTZ & HARRIS, AMERICAN PUBLIC FINANCE 344 (7th ed.
1959), classifies five categories of general sales tax. They are:
(1) [R]etail sales tax; (2) single stage excise on sales by manu-
facturers or wholesalers; (3) multiple-stage gross sales or turnover
tax, applying to all sales by manufacturers, wholesalers, and re-
tailers; (4) gross income tax, applying not only to sales of tangi-
ble commodities but also to gross income from services; finally
(5) the tax on value added may be considered a general consump-
tion, as well as a business tax.
In one of the first authoritative works on sales tax, HAIG & SHoup, THE SALES
TAX IN THE AMERICAN STATES 3, 4 (1934) classifies sales taxes as:
(a) Retail Sales Tax, which is imposed only on sales of tangible
personal property at retail or for use or consumption. The tax also
includes sales of utility services and levies on admissions.
(b) General Sales Tax, which reaches sales of tangible personal
property both at retail and for resale, and also the acts of extract-
ing natural resources and of manufacturing.
(c) Gross Receipts Tax, which has the essential elements of the
general sales tax and in addition is levied upon sales of intangibles.
(d) Gross Income Taxes, which include (a), (b), and (c), above,
and in addition receipts from non-business activities such as rents,
interests, salaries.
CCH STATE TAX REP. ILL. Correlator 5 6072 (1967).
10 Department of Revenue, Rules and Regulations, Rule 7 (1963).
CASE NOTES
who sold meals to purchasers for use and consumption. After Rule
7 (1) was amended, vendors affected by the rule so as to be subject
to the IROT included sellers of food and beverages to airlines, pro-
vided that the items sold were delivered in Illinois and were used to
serve both passengers and crew.' The rule was only applicable
however, if the airline did not charge separately for the food and
beverages.
Following promulgation and enactment of the revenue amend-
ment, Hot Shoppes paid the IROT to the state for the food vendor's
sales of meals and foodstuffs and American paid the use taxes to
Hot Shoppes." This procedure was followed from November 1 to
November 15, 1963. Thereafter, Hot Shoppes and American filed
credit claims for taxes paid, basing this action on the belief that
they were not liable for either tax. 3 A referee of the Department of
Revenue heard arguments and presentations of evidence concerning
the Department's amended rule and its enforcement." The referee
denied these claims for credit in 1971." Complaints were then filed
by Hot Shoppes and American for administrative review in the cir-
cuit court of Cook County. The Cook County Circuit Court affirm-
ed the hearing referee's decision and American appealed." The Illi-
nois Supreme Court, in upholding the decision of the Circuit Court
of Cook County, relied on three sources: the evidence presented be-
fore the Department of Revenue's hearing referee;" the lower court's
interpretation of the term "valuable consideration;"" and past Illi-
nois cases involving the IROT and Use Tax."
The Illinois high court based a portion of its decision on evidence
presented to the Department of Revenue's hearing referee that
American did not resell the purchased items because it neither offer-
"Department of Revenue, Rules and Regulations, Rule 7.1(h) (1963). It
should be noted that application of the Illinois ROT to sales of foodstuffs to air-
lines in the 1950's was attempted but the Illinois courts decided in favor of the
airlines. These decisions were all prior to the Department of Revenue's addition
of 7.1(h) to its revenue rules.
" Am. Airlines v. Dep't of Revenue, 58 Ill.2d 251, 319 N.E.2d 28 (1974).




"1Id. at , 319 N.E.2d at 31.
"Id.
"Id. at -'319 N.E.2d at 31-33.
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ed a refund nor made a separate charge." According to that evi-
dence, passengers who did not receive meals because of exigent cir-
cumstances such as turbulent weather conditions could not obtain
cash refunds for this portion of the passenger's ticket. The high
court held that because the airline did not provide a refund for
meals that were not served there was not a sale of the food to the
airline's passengers.' American's policy of giving a voucher, re-
deemable for a meal at an airport restaurant," to any passenger that
wanted the scheduled but unserved meal was dismissed by the
court. The Illinois Supreme Court said that this arrangement did
not constitute a refund, stating that a passenger who did not re-
quest a voucher could not obtain a refund." Furthermore, testimony
to the hearing referee by a tax administrator for American indicated
that American not only made no internal markup on food served
aboard the aircraft but had no specific policy or intent to make a
profit.' The Illinois Supreme Court was not impressed that the
Civil Aeronautics Board included the cost of food when flight price
schedules were determined.2 According to the Illinois high court,
the cost of food is included in the price schedules simply because it
is a necessary operating expense to enable American to compete
with other airlines.'
The Illinois high court decided that there could be no retail sale
of the food to the airline's passengers unless there was a separate
charge for the meals. The separate charge concept has its origin
in the early practice of airlines of having a passenger pay a separate
charge for a meal when he purchased his flight ticket.' Later, be-
20 Id. at , 319 N.E.2d at 28.
21 d. at -, 319 N.E.2d at 30.
22 Brief for Appellant at 30, Am. Airlines v. Dep't of Revenue, 58 Ill.2d 251,
319 N.E.2d 28 (1974).
23 319 N.E.2d at 31.
24 Brief for Appellee at 8, Am. Airlines v. Dep't of Revenue, 58 Ill. 2d 251,
319 N.E.2d 28 (1974).
2 Brief for Appellant at 30, Am. Airlines v. Dep't of Revenue, 58 Ill. 2d 251,
319 N.E.2d 28 (1974). This portion of the brief discussed the CAB's use of costs
in determining the ticket base price.
216319 N.E.2d at 31.
27 Id. at 251, 319 N.E.2d at 28.
2' American Airlines had offered a program in the 1950's on its flights called
Royal Coach Service. Under this service a passenger paid a separate charge for
a meal when he purchased his flight ticket.
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cause of impracticality and bookkeeping problems the separate
charge service was discontinued. ' The term 'separate charge' as
utilized by the Illinois courts traces its importance to Rule 7.1 (h) of
the Illinois Department of Revenue Rules. Under the rule, if Ameri-
can assessed a separate charge, there would be no tax liability. The
Illinois lower court interpreted the word 'separate charge' in Rule
7.1 (h) as intending to describe a retail transaction as commonly
understood to be an over the counter transaction and that only a
separate charge would be acceptable as evidence of a retail sale."'
The second important issue before the state supreme court in
American Airlines was the interpretation of the term "valuable con-
sideration.""1 American contended that it had entered a contractual
agreement when a ticket was purchased by a passenger." The airline
promised to provide a meal for its passengers, and the purchase of
a ticket constituted consideration for that promise; hence American
can claimed that this established mutual and reciprical considera-
tion. The Illinois high court, however, refused to recognize the
formation of such a contractual arrangement since the formation
of a contract requires mutual assent. ' Because intent and awareness
of the formation of a contract are a vital part of a contract, the
court decided that every passenger would have had to realize that
he had made a contract for delivery and service of meals on board
flight before a contractual agreement showing valuable considera-
tion would be arguable.' A further problem to be decided was
whether American's promise to its passengers was the type of prom-
ise that would qualify for a contract. If a meal was not served, a
29 During this same period, the 1950's, United Airlines offered a similar serv-
ice. In 1957 United petitioned the CAB and requested that they be permitted to
cease the separate charge service and include the price of a meal in every fare
while offering each passenger a meal. The CAB granted this request.
"Judge Sarnow was the Cook County Circuit Court judge who reviewed the
Department of Revenue's hearing referee. Judge Sarnow was also one of the
counsel for the Illinois Attorney General who argued the case of Burrows v.
Hollingsworth, 415 11. 202, 112 N.E.2d 706 (1953). The Burrows opinion re-
jected the Department of Revenue's contention that a separate charge was neces-
sary for a sale at retail.
31 58 Ill.2d at -, 319 N.E.2d at 31.
22 Brief for Appellant at 29-34.
'58 Il.2d at -, 319 N.E.2d at 32. In addition the Illinois Supreme Court
said that consideration must be bargained for. (RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS
75, comment b (1932); 1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 100 (3d ed. 1957).
3458 111.2d at -, 319 N.E.2d at 32.
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passenger's only remedy was to accept a meal voucher. On the other
hand, if American had, for some reason, failed to provide transpor-
tation to a passenger, the airline would have refunded the price of
a ticket. Therefore, the Illinois court found that American was
essentially selling air transportation to its passengers and was not
contracting for meals.'
Additional support for the American Airlines decision was drawn
(by the Illinois high court) from case law involving the application
of the IROT. The American Airlines court relied on Robertson
Products Co. v. Nudelman" and Fefferman v. Marohn" to buttress
its decision. Robertson presented a fact situation similar to Ameri-
can Airlines: a vendor sold paper products, such as tissue paper
and napkins, to hotels and office buildings." These facilities did not,
in turn, add a specific charge for paper products used by its resi-
dents to the total amount charged." The Illinois Supreme Court
found that no direct charge was made by the hotel for the paper
products and, therefore, a normal sale or resale did not occur." The
articles furnished, the Robertson court stated, were those to be con-
sidered as part of the operating expense of the hotel business."' The
cost of these items would enter into the rates which were charged,
much the same as other items, such as linen towels and glass cups,
were added into the total operating cost. In Fefferman the com-
plaints of three different vendors concerning imposition of the IROT
and Use Tax were consolidated on appeal." All three vendors sold
towels, bedding gauze, and other medical supplies to the State of
Illinois, its institutions, and to Cook County Hospital. The vendors
contended that because the purchasers had either sold, transferred,
11 58 Ill.2d at __, 319 N.E.2d at 32. The Illinois Supreme Court stated that
"there was no sale of meals within the meaning of section 1 of the Retailers'
Occupational Tax Act (par. 440)."
26 389 Ill. 281, 59 N.E.2d 655 (1945). The Illinois Supreme Court in Robert-
son emphasized that a direct charge was not made for the tissue paper and nap-
kins. "Hotels and office buildings are not in the business of selling paper nap-
kins, tissue cups, plates and the like, but they are in the business of running a
hotel or an office building or the like." Robertson Products Co. v. Nudelman,
389 Ill. 281, 285-86, 59 N.E.2d 655, 657.
'7408 Ill. 542, 97 N.E.2d 785 (1951).
38 389 Ill. at 281, 59 N.E.2d at 655.
39 Id.
401d. at -, 59 N.E.2d at 657.
41 Id.
42 408 Ill. at 542, 97 N.E.2d at 785.
CASE NOTES
or given the supplies to their inmates or patients, the transfer by
the vendors to various state and county divisions and the purchase
of these items from the vendors was not a retail sale and was there-
fore exempt from the imposition of the IROT.' The Illinois Su-
preme Court, concluding that the vendors owed the IROT, found
that the sale was one for use and consumption and was not a resale
since the purchasers did not subsequently sell or transfer for a spe-
cific consideration."
The Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Burrows Co. v. Holling-
worth runs contrary to the Robertson-Feflerman decisions. In that
case, sales of medical supplies and food were made to a hospital
which subsequently transferred them to patients. Contending that
there was a "retransfer for a valuable consideration," the supplier
urged that he was not subject to the IROT.' The Illinois Supreme
Court held that retail sale of the products occured between the hos-
pital and its patients."
In American Airlines the Illinois high court distinguished Bur-
rows and found it inapplicable, announcing that the Department
of Revenue had incorrectly argued the Burrows case. 8 According
to the court in American Airlines, by contending that the sales to
the hospital were for "use and consumption" by the hospital, the
Department of Revenue in Burrows had misinterpreted the term
"valuable consideration." 9 Had the Burrows opinion been the con-
trolling precedent in American Airlines, the transfer by the airline
to its passengers would have been a transfer for a valuable consid-
eration. In reality, the American Airlines decision must be seen as
effectively overruling the Burrows decision and affirming the Robert-
son-Fefferman view.
The American Airlines case should also be compared with a
similar case decided by the Georgia Supreme Court under sale and
use taxes which are very similar to the IROT and Use Taxes. The
Georgia Supreme Court determined the validity of these taxes in
43 id. at -, 97 N.E.2d at 787.
"Id. at -, 97 N.E.2d at 788.
45 415 111. at 202, 112 N.E.2d at 706.
46 Id. at , 112 N.E.2d at 707.
47 Id. at -, 112 N.E.2d at 709.
48 58 I11.2d at __, 319 N.E.2d at 32.
491d.
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Undercofler v. Eastern Air Lines." Georgia had imposed its sales
and use taxes on meals purchased by Eastern Air Lines from a
caterer. These meals were sold to Eastern for consumption by the
airline passengers. The Georgia high court held that a retail sale did
occur, but that it was not between the airline and the passenger. The
court in Undercofler found that the act of purchasing a ticket im-
plied passenger consent to a contract for delivery of a meal during
the flight and, therefore, the "sale" for revenue purposes was deem-
ed complete the moment the ticket was sold." The Georgia Supreme
Court did not refer to any requirement that the airline itemize a
separate charge for the purchase of a meal to become a sale at re-
tail. The sale, according to the Georgia court, was not a sale of food
for consumption by the airline but a sale of goods to be resold later
to the individual passengers." Thus, under a fact situation similar
to American Airlines the Georgia Supreme Court decided that a
retail tax did not apply between the airline and the caterer since a
retail sale did occur between the airline and the passengers.
The Illinois Supreme Court's decision in American Airlines is
readily subject to criticism on several grounds. The comparison in
American Airlines between passenger meals and the situation in
Robertson of napkins, tissue, and soap at office buildings, seems
tenuous. The soap and napkins are considered a social amenity and
convenience. If a flight should be airborne during a usual and com-
mon meal time, then a passenger should be entitled to the serving
of a meal. Because airlines have become a dominant transportation
device in our present society, all passengers should be permitted to
retain a semblance of routine in their lives while traveling. The
meal is also necessary to enable the airline to remain competitive.
The reasoning in Undercofler indicates that it is possible to construe
the airline's service of food to its passengers as a sale to an ultimate
user or consumer. The Illinois Department of Revenue and Supreme
Court could force airlines to reinstate a separate charge for meals
and beverages to avoid the IROT and Use Tax but a return to this
practice would seem to create a new host of problems. Whether a
return to the separate charge practice is economically feasible for
the airlines is extremely questionable.
50221 Ga. 824, 147 S.E.2d 436 (1966).




One disturbing question remains as to why American litigated
the IROT and Use Tax issue through the entire Illinois judicial pro-
cess. Part of the answer is discoverable with a deeper understanding
of the concepts underlying the sales and use tax area. As mentioned
earlier, a sales tax is a tax on the sales transaction while a use tax
is designed to cover the actual use of the purchased item in that
state." Use taxes are designed to reach transactions which would
otherwise go taxfree as transactions in interstate commerce." Com-
pensating use taxes are imposed in certain states to collect the state
sales tax from purchasers who buy goods outside the state and are
usually levied on the use, storage or consumption of goods brought
in from another jurisdiction.' Without a use tax, a purchaser could
buy his goods in a state which had no sales tax and escape all other
states' sales taxes. American could escape all state excise taxes if it
could avoid paying such taxes in the initial state in which it pur-
chased the beverages and food suppliers. If another state attempted
to levy a tax on the sale of food to the airline passengers, American
would be able to claim that this action was an unconstitutional tax-
ation of interstate commerce. To achieve this desired effect, Ameri-
can needed first to receive a favorable decision on the IROT and
Use Tax issues.
53 68 AM. JUR.2d Sales and Use Tax § 191 (1972).
4 Id.
51 Id. It should be considered that American fought this initial imposition of
the sales tax on the transaction between themselves and the food supplier based
on the following theory. Although the foodstuffs were purchased in Illinois, this
does not mean that they were in fact used in that state. Noting the geographic
position of Chicago's O'Hare airport and the direction of most flights leaving
there, American could have effectively argued that their passengers, the ultimate
consumers, had never used the meals while in the state of Illinois. With this
strategy American hoped to avoid the use taxes.
A perhaps overriding argument could have been made by the state of Illinois
in response if American would have used this theory. The state would argue
that to permit this transaction to escape taxation in Illinois would be to allow
the sale of foodstuffs and beverages to escape taxation in any state. Another
argument could be voiced by the state of Illinois. This would be based on the
Illinois definition of use. Use is defined in Illinois as "the exercise by any person
of any right or power over tangible personal property incident to ownership of
that property" ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 120 § 439.2 (1939). The state of Illinois
may declare that there is indeed a contract formed between the passenger and
American for the delivery of the meal. It, the state of Illinois, could further
contend that the passenger exercises some type of ownership role over the meal
and is within the state's definition of "use." In order to elude the Illinois ROT,
American could argue that the sale of the foodstuffs and beverages did not occur
in Illinois but while the flight was airborne, and often while passing over other
states.
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The other reason American pursued this case to its conclusion
was its federal income tax implications. Section 164(a) (4) of the
Internal Revenue Code allows the deduction from gross income of
interest and taxes paid in special situations." Generally, a tax can
be deducted only by the person or company upon whom it is im-
posed," however, there is an exception to this rule regarding certain
state retail sales and gasoline taxes." In these special instances,
these taxes are deductible by the consumer although the tax is not
imposed directly upon him." The Illinois retail taxing scheme be-
comes significant in this matter. The Illinois ROT is imposed upon
the retailer, but is offset by the Illinois Use Tax on the consumer.
In the American Airlines situation, it appears that American, al-
though they have lost the case, will benefit through federal income
tax deductions.6 Because American is, in reality, paying IROT
through their payment of the Use Tax, the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice should permit them to deduct the Use Tax which they pay. As
the Illinois Supreme Court decided, American is the consumer of
the foodstuffs and beverages and must pay the Use Tax on all pur-
chases of these items.
The Illinois Attorney General indicated that the American Air-
lines decision will affect all carriers purchasing and serving bever-
ages and food in the State of Illinois.' The Attorney General also
said that the collection of the Use Tax from the air carriers who
purchase food in Illinois could yield from three to five million dol-
lars in additional revenue for the state." Thus the American Airlines
decision may have opened a new era of taxaiton of commercial air-
6 The Internal Revenue Code permits a deduction for state, local and foreign
taxes incurred in carrying on a trade or business, or in a "nonbusiness" activity.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 164.
"Treas. Reg. § 1.164-5 (1957).
I5 1d.
"Id. The reason for permitting the consumer to deduct the use taxes paid is
simple. This deduction is permitted because the customer, (consumer) is paying
the sales tax (IROT in Illinois) through the use of a complementary use tax.
6This scheme is unique to the Illinois ROT and Use Tax system.
61 The American case is sufficient proof to the Internal Revenue Service that
American Airlines is the ultimate consumer and the tax is imposed on them.
6258 Ill.2d at 251, 319 N.E.2d at 28.
62Av. L. REP., Intro. 5 585.
64 Id.
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lines in the United States, since at least thirty-four states presently
have some form of retail sales tax.'
American's strategy was to escape all liability for the Illinois
ROT and Use Tax. By showing that the foodstuffs were used outside
the state, American could argue that they were exempt from the two
taxes. This was contingent upon showing that the foodstuffs and
beverages were resold to American's passengers and that American
itself was not an ultimate consumer or user. American was unable
to prove this to the satisfaction of the Illinois Supreme Court. But
by losing on this point American covered themselves for future in-
come tax purposes. Whether American was the consumer of the
foodstuffs, liable for the Use Tax, and therefore eligible to deduct
the Use Tax, the American Airlines case would seem to be sufficient
authority to support this tax deduction. American Airlines can also
be viewed as a diversion of tax revenue to the state and away from
the federal government. As states continue to become hardpressed
to meet their ever increasing expenditures, decisions such as Ameri-
can Airlines will become more numerous and quite important.
Leonard H. Plog II
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION-EXEMPTION THREE-
SWAP Reports are Specifically Exempt From Disclosure by Statute
Because FAA Administrator Issued a Withholding Order Pursuant
to Discretionary Authority. Administrator v. Robertson, - U.S.
-, 95 S. Ct. 2140 (1975).
Pursuant to its responsibility to promote the safety of civil
aeronautics' and its duty to employ inspectors who shall advise
and cooperate with air carriers in their inspection and maintenance
operations,' the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) developed
'John Due, Sales Taxation (1957) 3.
1 "The Administrator is empowered and it shall be his duty to promote the
safety of flight of civil aircraft in air commerce ....... 49 U.S.C. § 1421(a)
(1970).
'The Administrator shall employ inspectors who shall be charged with the
duty (1) of making . . . inspections . . . and (2) of advising and cooperating
1975]
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the Systems-worthiness Analysis Program3 (SWAP). SWAP teams
of experienced investigators make periodic visitations to certified air
carriers to inspect and analyze their safety and maintenance opera-
tions in order to find any area of maintenance, operation, manage-
ment, or performance which needs improvement.' To facilitate free
flow of information and cooperation by the air carriers the program
operates with the understanding that the contents of the final SWAP
reports, which contain the findings and recommendations of the
inspection team,' will not be released to the public. Plaintiffs re-
quested and were denied access to SWAP reports' for the year
1969.' While an intra-agency appeal was pending, the Air Trans-
port Association (ATA), on behalf of numerous member air
with each air carrier in . . . inspection and maintenance . . . by the air carrier.
49 U.S.C. § 1425(b) (1970).
3 FAA Order 8000.3C, April 14, 1972, is the SWAP Handbook currently in
effect. It cancelled the previous SWAP Handbook, FAA Order 8000.3B, July 7,
1969, which was in effect when at least some of the SWAP reports requested by
Plaintiff were prepared. This note was prepared relying only on FAA Order
8000.3C [Hereinafter cited as Handbook].
4 Handbook, para. 100. Special SWAP inspections concentrating on systems
suspected of being deficient are scheduled on an as-needed basis whenever there
are indications that the performance of a particular air carrier is falling below
an acceptable level. Handbook, para. 101.
5Handbook, para. 202.
6 "[Clopies of SWAP reports or information therein shall not be publicly re-
leased or handled indiscriminately. Individual SWAP reports shall be considered
as being 'For Official Use Only' . . . . ... Handbook, para. 204. SWAP reports
contain much information that could be embarrassing to air carriers and useful
in personal injury or wrongful death litigation against them. Some idea of the
content of a SWAP report can be gained from the final report format and content
outline set out at Handbook, para. 202-b, which provides in part as follows:
(2)(d) The last portion of this section summary will reflect or
summarize the net effect that the deficiencies noted during the in-
spection have or will have upon economy and safety, the operator,
his aircraft, and personnel. This section will also contain a brief
statement of alleged noncompliance of the Federal Aviation Regu-
lations that were noted during the inspection.
(3) (b)3 Sufficient examples will be listed to document discrepan-
cies found during the onsite inspections.... They should be of such
quality to support legal enforcement action if deemed necessary by
the principal inspector.
The reports could be introduced as evidence to establish notice to an airline
that a specific defect was frequently occurring, which in turn would tend to estab-
lish a duty to check each aircraft for that defect.
7 The plaintiffs, associates of the Center for the Study of Responsive Law, a
Ralph Nader organization, brought this action to compel disclosure so that con-
sumers can decide which are the safer airlines based on the information contained
in the reports.
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carriers, requested under Section 1104 of the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958' (Act) that the Administrator issue an order with-
holding SWAP reports from public disclosure. The Administrator
made a determination that disclosure of the SWAP reports would
adversely affect the interests of the airlines and was not required in
the public interest, and ordered all SWAP reports in existence and
thereafter compiled to be withheld from public disclosure. Plain-
tiffs then brought suit seeking injunctive relief under the Freedom
of Information Act' (FOIA). The FAA contended that the SWAP
reports were within the third exempt category (hereinafter referred
to as Exemption Three)," which covers documents specifically
exempted from disclosure by other statutes. The district court dis-
agreed and ordered the reports released,11 and the FAA appealed.
After the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
affirmed in a 2-1 decision,"' the Supreme Court granted the FAA's
petition for certiorari. Held, Reversed: SWAP reports are specific-
ally exempted from disclosure by statute under Exemption Three
of the Freedom of Information Act and Section 1104 of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act." Administrator v. Robertson, - U.S. -, 95 S.
Ct. 2140 (1975).
849 U.S.C. S 1504 (1970) the text, in part, is as follows:
Any person may make written objection to the public disclosure of
information contained in any application, report, or document filed
pursuant to the provisions of this chapter or of information obtained
by he Board [the CAB] or the Administrator [of the FAA], pur-
suant to the provisions of this chapter, stating the grounds for such
objection. Whenever such objection is made, the Board or Adminis-
trator shall order such information withheld from public disclosure
when, in their judgment, a disclosure of such information would
adversely affect the interests of such person and is not required in
the interest of the public ...
'5 U.S.C. S 552 (1966). See K. Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary
Analysis, 34 CHi L. REv. 761 (1967); Attorney General's Memorandum on the
Public Information Section of the Administrative Procedure Act, reprinted at 20
AD. L. REP. 263 (1967); Note, The 1966 Freedom of Information Act-Early
ludicial Interpretations, 44 WASH. L. REv. 741 (1969); and Comment, The Free-
dom of Information Act: Access to Law, 36 FORD. L. REV. 765 (1968).
105 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1966).
" The disrict court did not file an opinion.
"Robertson v. Butterfield, 498 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
"The majority was composed of Burger, C.J., and White, Powell, Rehnquist,
and Blackmum, J.J. Stewart, J., joined by Marshall, J., concurred, and Douglas
and Brennan, J.J., dissented for the reasons given in Judge Fahy's majority opinion
for the court of appeals.
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Congress enacted the FOIA to replace section three" of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act! (APA), which dealt with the publica-
tion of information, rules, opinions, and public records by all fed-
eral agencies. The FOIA requires every federal agency, upon re-
quest from any person for identifiable records, to make the records
available,' unless the records are within the scope of one of nine
categories of information which are exempt from the requirement."'
The operative words of Exemption Three are "matters that are
. . . specifically exempted from disclosure by statute.' 8 Statutes
of various form, construction and language have been relied upon
by agencies as creating an exemption within the meaning of Ex-
emption Three, but each of the statutes involved can be generally
categorized as punitive," mandatory, or discretionary. An example
of a punitive statute is the Trade Secrets Act," which penalizes
the disclosure of certain kinds of information by any federal em-
ployee in an unauthorized manner. Several agencies have contend-
ed that this statute justifies withholding information under Exemp-
tion Three." The statute, however, only penalizes the unauthorized
disclosure of information; it does not speak to the question of
"Act of September 6, 1966, Pub. L. 89-554, § 552, 80 Stat. 378.
(a) This section applies, according to the provisions thereof, ex-
cept to the extent that there is involved (1) a function of the United
States requiring secrecy in the public interest; or (2) a matter relat-
ing solely to the internal management of an agency.
(b) ...
(c) Each agency shall publish or, in accordance with published
rule, make available to public inspection all final opinions or orders
in the adjudication of cases (except those required for good cause
to be held confidential and not cited as precedents) and all rules.
(d) Except as otherwise required by statute, matters of official
record shall be made available, in accordance with published rule,
to persons properly and directly concerned, except information held
confidential for good cause found. (Emphasis added).
"Administrative Procedure Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 2(a), 60 Stat.
237-44, codified by Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. 89-554, 80 Stat. 381 as 5 U.S.C.
551 et seq.
165 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970).
175 U.S.C. S 552(b) (1970).
" Id. at (3).
1" 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1970).
"See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e) (1970).
" See Schapiro & Co. v. S.E.C., 339 F. Supp. 467 (D.D.C. 1972), and Frankel
v. S.E.C., 336 F. Supp. 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 460 F.2d
813 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972).
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whether authorization exists in any particular case." The statute
operates only after the question of authorization has been deter-
mined. The example of a mandatory statute is found in 44 U.S.C.
Sections 2103-2111,"s which specifically details whether certain
public documents should be disclosed or remain confidential. The
statutes grant very little discretion to the Archivist of the United
States or the Administrator of General Services and limits and con-
ditions the discretion that is given.' The courts that have consid-
ered mandatory statutes have agreed with the agencies that man-
datory statutes specifically exempt matters from disclosure and
therefore fall within the scope of Exemption Three.2
Unlike litigation involving punitive or mandatory statutes, litiga-
tion involving discretionary statutes has resulted in inconsistent
decisions.' A discretionary statute, of which section 1104 is an
example, grants to an agency official the power to determine
whether information should be withheld or disclosed, and provides
only a general, subjective standard, or no standard at all, to guide
him in the exercise of his judgment.
Section 11047 allows anyone to object to the disclosure of infor-
mation, even though the information may not have been obtained
from him. The only statutory requirement for making an objection
is that it be submitted in writing. Upon receiving an objection, the
Administrator has the power to order the information withheld if
two conditions are met. First, disclosure of the information must
adversely affect the interest of the objecting party, and secondly,
disclosure must not be required in the interest of the public.
Assuming that the interest of the objecting party will be ad-
22 "But this circular reasoning adds nothing to the defendants' armory. 18
U.S.C. 5 1905 does not establish an exemption from the Freedom of Information
Act, but merely penalizes a disclosure of non-exempt material. We must still
determine whether the material here sought is or is not exempt." 336 F. Supp.
at 678-79.
23 (1970).
"See also 43 U.S.C. § 1398(a) (1970). "A witness may submit material
on a confidential basis for the use of the Commission and, if so submitted, the
Commission shall not make the material public."
25See Nichols v. United States, 460 F.2d 671 (10th Cir. 1972).
26 Compare Stretch v. Weinberger, 359 F. Supp. 702 (D.N.J. 1973), with
People of the State of California v. Richardson, 351 F. Supp. 733 (N.D. Cal.
1972).
2 See note 8 supra. Another example of a discretionary statute is 42 U.S.C.
S 1306 (1970), which is the statute involved in the cases cited in note 26 supra.
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versely affected, the key to the Administrator's determination of
whether to issue a withholding order is his assessment of the public
interest. Whether the public interest is to b weighed against ad-
verse effect to the objecting party's interest is not clear, but that
would appear to be a permissible interpretation." Even so, the Ad-
ministrator's discretionary assessment of the public interest is ne-
cessarily a subjective judgment because "the public interest" is a
subjective standard.
The court of appeals held that information ordered withheld
by the Administrator pursuant to section 1104 was not "specifically
exempted from disclosure by statute."
The ordinary meaning of the language of Exemption 3 is
that the statute therein referred to must itself specify the docu-
ments or categories of documents it authorizes to be withheld
from public scrutiny. Section 1104... fails to do this."
The court of appeals decision in Robertson was not the first to
hold that documents must be specifically exempted by statute," and
this interpretation appears to comport with the plain meaning of
section 1104. The Fifth Circuit three years earlier had held, con-
trary to the later decision in Robertson, that Section 1104 was
within the scope of Exemption Three." The decision was barren of
any analysis or discussion of this particular question, and was not
discussed by the court of appeals or the Supreme Court in the in-
stant case."
28 The court of appeals saw Section 1104 as a congressional delegation of
authority to weigh the adverse effect to the interest of the objecting party against
the public interest. 498 F.2d at 1032.
29 Id.
"'See Cutler v. C.A.B., 375 F. Supp. 722, 724 (D.D.C. 1974) where that
court said:
The Board fails, however, to give sufficient meaning to the Act's re-
quirement that documents be specifically exempted by statute. If
these words are to have any meaning at all, they must require that
the statutes in question either clearly identify some class of docu-
ments to be kept confidential or, at the very least, prescribe specific
standards by which an administrative agency can determine the pro-
priety of disclosure.
"1 Evans v. Department of Transportation, 446 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1971).
32 The dissenting judge in the court of appeals made reference to Evans only
in the last paragraph of his dissent, and the Supreme Court mentioned Evans
only in a footnote to sustain the proposition that obviously the language of Ex-
emption Three is ambiguous.
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The Supreme Court did not attempt any statutory construction
of Exemption Three, citing the variety of construction given the
language of Exemption Three by the lower courts as ample evi-
dence that relevant portions of the exemption are unclear and am-
biguous, thus compelling resort to the legislative history." The
Court found that the legislative history clearly indicated that Con-
gress was aware of inconsistent laws and prior congressional de-
cisions that in certain instances confidentiality was essential to pro-
tect the public interest."M The Court also found several indications
of a congressional intent that prior statutes remain unaffected by
the FOIA," and even a specific indication that section 1104 was
within the scope of Exemption Three."
The heart of the problem with regard to the relationship of the
FOIA to prior statutes was stated by the Court as follows:
The respondents can prevail only if the Act is to be read as re-
pealing by implication all existing statutes "which restrict public
access to specific public records.""7
Although the general thrust of this proposition is clear, it is
submitted that the statement is somewhat misleading and inaccur-
ate. First, the respondent's construction of Exemption Three does
not require the implicit repeal of all prior withholding statutes; it
only requires the implicit repeal of the discretionary withholding
statutes." The respondent's construction was consistent with the
continued efficacy of mandatory withholding statutes.3" Secondly,
for the Court's statement to make sense the Court must be using
the word 'specific" with the broad, "illusory" meaning attributed
33 See cases cited at footnotes 26, 30, and 31 supra.
34 Administrator v. Robertson, 95 S. Ct. 2140, 2146 (1975).
3595 S. Ct. at 2147.
36 More specifically, when the Civil Aeronautics Board brought § 1104 to the
attention of both the House and Senate Hearings of 1965, and expressed the
agency interpretation that the provision was encompassed within Exemption 3,
no question was raised or challenge made to the agency view of the impact of
that exemption. Id. (footnotes omitted). This may be a clear indication of con-
gressional intent with regard to this matter, but it is a better example of how
an agency can effectively "salt" the record.
7 95 S. Ct. at 2147.
"See note 27 supra for examples of discretionary statutes.
39See text at note 23 supra and note 24 for examples of mandatory statutes.
See text at note 29 supra and notes 45 and 48 infra for criteria to determine
whether a particular statute is mandatory or discretionary.
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to it by the FAA. If used with the narrow meaning attributed to
it by the court of appeals, then the word "specific" would indicate
that some language in the statutes restricted public access to partic-
ular public records. " In effect, the Court's thoughts would be more
accurately conveyed if the word "specific" were left out altogether."'
These criticisms, however, do not meet the thrust of the Court's
proposition, which is basically correct. The respondent's construc-
tion of Exemption Three does require the implicit repeal of all dis-
cretionary withholding statutes, and, as the Court pointed out, re-
peals by implication are disfavored."2 The Court's opinion suggests
that there is a presumption against repeal by implication which
must be overcome by the party arguing for that result, and in this
case the evidence of congressional intent favoring repeal by impli-
cation was not sufficient to overcome the presumption.'
The primary evidence favoring repeal by implication was two-
fold. First, the "ordinary meaning of the language" construction
given to Exemption Three by the court of appeals would logically
entail repeal by implication of all discretionary withholding stautes.
The "ordinary meaning of the language" construction was that
the statute relied on by the agency must itself specify (i) the docu-
ments, or (ii) the categories of documents which may be withheld."
The Court said that "[t]o require this interpretation would be to
ask of Congress a virtually impossible task,"" meaning that Con-
gress would either have to review every category of documents and
40 For more on the narrow meaning see text at note 29 supra.
41 Respondents would be quick to point out that the Court's holding in this
case would also make more sense if the words "specifically" and "by statute"
were eliminated from Exemption Three which is the effect of the Court's holding.
More probably than not, the Court's statement is really a misstatement caused
by incorporation of the language of the House Report without realizing that the
combination produced exactly the wrong meaning. See 95 S. Ct. at 2147.
2Id. Citing the Regional Rail Reorganization Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974) at
133, which in turn cited Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974).
41 The Court never uses the word "presumption," and it is probably best that
they did not, but that is the legal concept the Court seems to be spelling out.
4 See text at note 29 supra.
495 S.Ct. at 2147. The Court went on to say: "Such a construction would
also imply that Congress had undertaken to reassess every delegation of authority
to withhold information which it had made before the passage of this legislation-
a task which the legislative history shows it clearly did not undertake." This is
a permissible, although by no means a mandatory, inference. If Congress intended
to take exclusive statutory control of the withholding of information, it would
have no need to review delegations of withholding authority.
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all other individual documents possessed by the federal agencies or
assume that there is no valid reason to withhold any documents not
reviewed. The difficulty of the task would depend on how broadly
the categories were drawn, but it would still be a formidable task.
With regard to the Court's assessment of the court of appeals in-
terpretation of Exemption Three, what the Court did not say, and
what may be inferred from what it did say, should be noted.
First, the Court did not mention a third alternative advanced by
the opinion in Cutler v. CAB,"6 which was that the statute referred
to in Exemption Three could "prescribe specific standards by
which an administrative agency can determine the propriety of dis-
closure."" This method of specifying documents which may be
withheld from public scrutiny grants Congress greater flexibility
than the alternatives mentioned by the Court. It allows Congress
to balance the desirability of freedom of information against the
need for secrecy without having to undertake "the virtually im-
possible task" of reviewing each category of documents. It permits
Congress to determine the specific criteria which must be met in
order to justify withholding information while leaving the appli-
cation of the criteria in any particular case to the agency.
Secondly, the Court, by implication, rejected any argument that,
in enacting the FOIA, Congress had already undertaken to regu-
late exclusively by statute all withholding of information by federal
agencies, that Exemption Three was the mechanism by which Con-
gress intended to adjust the basic scheme set out in the FOIA, and
that Congress intended to eliminate all agency withholding dis-
cretion. It is true that the legislative history would not support the
argument that Congress had consciously undertaken this grand
proposal, yet the stated purpose of the FOIA and the actual lan-
guage of the FOIA are consistent therewith. Congress certainly
intended to limit the discretionary authority of the agencies to
withhold information that was the primary motivation behind the
act. The question to which Congress never specifically addressed
itself was exactly how far it intended to limit agency discretion.
Did it merely intend to eliminate the one discretionary withholding
statute which any federal agency could rely upon, or did it intend
to eliminate all discretionary statutes? Did Congress actually realize
46375 F. Supp. 722 (D.D.C. 1974).
, Id. See note 30 supra.
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that other discretionary statutes which were just as vague as see-
ion 3 of the APA could still be relied upon by some agencies? Did
Congress fully apprehend the consequences of "the ordinary mean-
ing of the language" that it used in Exemption Three? Nowhere in
the legislative history does Congress answer these questions, and
the Court had to draw what answers it could from silence."
The foregoing analysis has anticipated and assumed the second
point of evidence favoring repeal by implication. That is, one major
purpose of the FOIA was to set up workable standards to deter-
mine which documents may be exempt from public disclosure by
replacing such vague phrasing as "in the public interest" and "for
good cause found," which were in the FOIA's predecessor statutes,'9
with specific definitions of information which may be withheld."
The argument is that the continued efficacy of such phrases in
other statutes as grounds upon which information may be withheld
is inconsistent with what Congress intended to accomplish by the
FOIA, and therefore, section 1504 must have been implicitly re-
pealed.
The Court, however, was not persuaded to adopt the court of
appeals' narrow construction and its implications. The Court's
view was that "it was inescapable that some regulatory authorities
be vested with broad, flexible discretion." 1 As the Court pointed
out, there is no inevitable inconsistency between a general intent
to replace the broad standards and a specific intent to preserve for
specific agencies broad discretion on what information is to be
protected in the public interest."' As said very clearly in the con-
curring opinion, the Court was simply not convinced that repeal
by implication was the intent of Congress, and there lies the basis
of its decision."
Robertson has several consequences, the most immediate of
which is that the FAA does not have to disclose the SWAP re-
41 The general intent on the part of Congress to leave "prior specific statutes"
intact and unrepealed is ambiguous with regard to this issue; it is consistent with
the arguments and constructions advanced on either side, depending on what is
meant by "specific."
41 See note 15 supra for the language of the statute.
50 See H.R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. at 2 (1966), U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News (1966), at 2419. See note 29 infra.





ports." The Court's decision also allows the FAA and CAB to
withhold any other information or documents whenever the Ad-
ministrator or the Board determines that nondisclosure is in the
public interest. This in turn raises the interesting question of the
scope of review of a nondisclosure decision by the FAA or CAB.
Section 3 of the APA did not have any provisions for review
of agency decisions not to disclose.' The only review obtainable
was available through Section 10(e) (2) (a) of the APA," and
the standard of review was "abuse of discretion." This standard of
review was made even more vague by the fact that the agency au-
thority to withhold was founded in such vague phrases as "in the
public interest" and "for good cause found." The FOIA sought to
rectify this situation not just by eliminating the vague phrases and
replacing them with specific standards, but also by providing that
upon complaint to the appropriate district court a determination
de novo would be made of the propriety of the agency decision
not to disclose, and that the burden of justifying the decision is
upon the agency." The question raised by the Court's decision is
whether the propriety of the decision to withhold is to be reviewed
against the abuse of discretion standard by applying the public in-
terest standard to the particular fact situation de novo, or merely
whether the courts are to determine de novo whether the informa-
tion sought has been withheld by an order of the Administrator or
Board.
Although neither the majority nor the dissent concerned them-
selves with this question, the concurring opinion assumed the ans-
wer to the question. Relying on Environmental Protection Agency
v. Mink,' Justice Stewart said that when an agency makes a non-
disclosure decision based on a statute of the kind referred to in
Exemption Three, "the only question 'to be determined in the dis-
trict court's de novo inquiry is the factual existence of such a sta-
tute .... ' W9
54 Nor does the CAB have to disclose the contingency plans for cutback of
airlines service in the event of reduction of the available fuel supply, the informa-
tion sought in the Cutler case. See 375 F. Supp. at 723.
55 See note 15 supra for text of statute.
-5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (1970).
575 U.S.C. S 552(a)(4)(B) (1970).
58410 U.S. 73 (1973).
59 95 S. Ct. at 2149.
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In keeping with the spirit and intent of the FOIA, the lower
courts could extend the de novo inquiry to include the decision to
issue the order on the argument that the statutory language used is
broad enough to sustain an extended inquiry' Or the courts could
fall back upon the general review provisions of the APA which
they used before the FOIA."'
The form of extended review used to reach the withholding de-
cision, if it is reached, will determine whether the propriety of the
order will be reviewed de novo or against the abuse of discretion
doctrine. Either way, in the case of section 1504 the abuse of dis-
cretion doctrine would be applied.
Against either form of extended review it may be argued that
the commonly accepted scope of the de novo proceeding is that
it is limited merely to a determination whether the documents
sought fall within the exemption relied upon by the agency. But
then, whether the documents sought should be within the exemp-
tion has never before been a relevant inquiry. A more persuasive
argument against falling back upon the general review provisions of
the APA is that the express provision in the FOIA for de novo
review implies that in FOIA cases the general review provisions are
no longer applicable. However, if the scope of a FOIA de novo
inquiry does not include review of the withholding decision, then
a concurrent review of that decision under the general review
provisions of the APA would not be precluded by the FOIA's
express review provisions. Justice Stewart's remarks may be con-
sistent with such concurrent review.
Yet one thing is clear. Under Justice Stewart's interpretation,
when an agency relies on Exemption Three, the FOIA, instead
of providing a de novo determination of the propriety of the de-
0 The key language of 5 U.S.C. § 552(A) (4) (b) is that "the Court shall de-
termine the matter de novo." The argument is that "the matter" can be con-
strued broadly enough to include the agency decision to disclose under the
statute referred to in Exemption Three.
615 U.S.C. § 706(1)(A) (1970).
62 Congress delegated the determination of the public interest to the Ad-
ministrator. It is doubtful that a federal district court will substitute its determina-
tion of the public interest for that of the Administrator's even in a de novo pro-
ceeding, unless it held that the Administrator's determination was "clearly erro-
neous" or an "abuse of discretion."
6" Judge Fahy's opinion below reflects a judicial attitude that will favor some
forms of extended review. See 498 F.2d at 1036.
CASE NOTES
cision to withhold the information, may have effectively insulated
the decision from any type of review at all. If this is the correct in-
terpretation of the language in Exemption Three, then the district
court action provided for is essentially meaningless."'
In determining whether this is a desirable result, another conse-
quence of the Court's decision must be considered. Exemption
Three, as interpreted by the Court, now covers all statutes that
require or permit nondisclosure of government information, no mat-
ter what, if any, standards for determining the propriety of the
nondisclosure the statutes may contain. An agency that can rely
upon any statute which permits nondisclosure is to a certain extent
exempt from the provisions of the FOIA, depending upon the
breadth of the nondisclosure permitted. Agencies such as the FAA
and CAB are effectively exempt from the provisions of the FOIA,
and their decisions to withhold may not be subject to review.
Moreover, agencies with only limited power to withhold docu-
ments have an opportunity to abuse that power, and such abuse
will go unchecked unless some form of extended review is pro-
vided.
To summarize, the FOIA had one major purpose and that was
to limit agency discretion to withhold information. The primary
consequence of the Supreme Court's decision in Administrator v.
Robertson is that, unless the scope of review in FOIA cases is ex-
tended, any agency decision based upon any withholding statute
other than the FOIA will have been insulated by the FOIA from
review, and even if the scope of agency review is extended, the
withholding power of the FAA, CAB, and any other agency with
a discretionary withholding statute will not have been affected by
the FOIA.
Congress must now assess the Court's decision and determine
whether the FAA, CAB, and other agencies with discretionary
withholding statutes shall be made subject to the provisions of the
FOIA. The Courts, in lieu of congressional action, must determine
whether and how, if at all, the scope of review in FOIA cases
should be extended. William R. Hayes
""It should be noted, however, as the Solicitor General has pointed out, that
under 49 U.S.C. § 1486, judicial review of an order of nondisclosure under 49
U.S.C. S 1104 [Section 1504] is available in the Court of Appeals." (footnote by
the Court, concurring opinion). The fact that this statute exists and its actual
effect are immaterial to the present discussion.
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